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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Nature of the Case. 
This case is domestic in nature, and originated in the context of a divorce between the two 
named parties. This appeal arises from the attempts by the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare, Bureau of Child Support ("DHW") to collect unpaid child support on behalf of 
Defendant-Respondent from Plaintiff-Appellant which Plaintiff-Appellant contends are barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On January 9, 1998 the District Court ordered Plaintiff-Appellant to pay child support (the 
"Child Support Order") for the parties' child Erik B. Peterson ("Erik"), whose date of birth is 
. Erik became emancipated on Apri120, 2002 when he became 18 years of age; 
therefore, any child support allegedly owed by Plaintiff-Appellant had to have accrued between 
January 9, 1998, the date ofthe Child Support Order, and , Erik's 18th birthday. 
The amount at issue is $7,125.01. 
The applicable statute oflimitations relating to the collection of child support arrearages 
existing prior to amendments passed in 2011 was §5-245, Idaho Code, which provided in 
pertinent part that 
[a]n action or proceeding to collect child support arrearages must be commenced 
within five (5) years after the child reaches the age of majority ... 
In 2011 the Legislature passed Idaho Session Laws Chapter 104, which altered the 
existing child support collection scheme by amending §5-245, § 1 0-111 0, and § 10-1111 (hereafter 
collectively referred to as the "Amendments"). 
The 2011 amendment of §5-245 provides in pertinent part that 
[a]n action or proceeding to collect child support arrearages, arising under an 
Idaho child support order, can be commenced at any time prior to the expiration of 
the resulting judgment or any renewal thereof. ... 
The amendment to § 1 0-111 0, among other things, allows for the creation of a lien against 
real property which arises from child support arrearages but imposes a five (5) year limitation of 
the lien measured from the death or emancipation of the child "unless the underIyingjudgment is 
renewed .... " The amendment to § 1 0-1111, among other things, purports to authorize D HW to 
renew "any Idaho child support judgment currently being enforced by [DHW], which otherwise 
could be deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." 
Based on the Amendments, DHW filed its Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support 
Judgment (the "Motion to Renew Judgment") on or about August 8, 2011, which is more than 
four (4) years after the expiration of the statute of limitations bar in §5-245 prior to the 
Amendments. 
In response, Debra filed her Motion to Dismiss and in the Alternative for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion to Dismiss") on or about December 8, 2011, wherein she argued, inter 
alia, that (1) under the language of the Amendments DHW is not entitled to resurrect the barred 
Child Support Order and (2) Plaintiff's right to assert the defense of statute of limitations is a 
vested right which cannot be taken from her by retroactive or retrospective legislation. 
The Magistrate Judge heard the Motion to Renew Judgment and the Motion to Dismiss on 
February 17, 2012, at which time the Court verbally denied the Motion to Dismiss. On or about 
March 1, 2012 Debra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court heard and denied on 
May 24,2012. As a result of the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Magistrate 
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Judge signed and entered its Final Order on Motion for Renewed Judgment (the "Final Order") on 
July 10, 2012. 
Debra appealed the Final Order to the District Court acting in its appellate capacity, which 
issued its Order on Motion to File the Renewed Judgment and Order of Remand on April 19, 
2013 (the "District Court Order") in which it reversed the Final Order and remanded the case to 
the Magistrate's Court "for proceedings consistent herewith." The District Court Order included 
the following: 
The statutes [Idaho Code § 1 0-111 0 and 10-1111] plainly and clearly set forth the 
provisions relating to the length of time a judgment ordering child support is valid and the 
process to renew that judgment. Based on the clear and unambiguous language of section 
10-1 110, a civil judgment expires unless a party. before that expiration, moves the court to 
renew the judgment. [citing] Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237, 239, 268, P.3d 1189, 1191 
(Ct. App. 2012). ("in short, a civil judgment-whether or not a lien is actually 
recorded-will last for five years, at which time it expires, unless a party, before that 
expiration, makes a motion to renew and such motion is granted by the court.") Idaho 
Code section 10-1111 simply allows any judgment entered pursuant to I.C. § 1 0-111 0 to 
be renewed, so long as the renewal occurs prior to the expiration of the lien. 
The District Court declined to be persuaded by the DHW's arguments that the legislature 
clearly expressed its intent in Senate Bill 110, 2001 Session Laws, Chapter 104 that the time in 
which child support judgments could be renewed was to be retroactively extended. Instead, the 
District Court concluded that because the statutes in question were clear and unambiguous, the 
District Court could not engage in statutory construction. 
Because the District Court reversed the Final Order on the basis that the statutes in 
question were clear and unambiguous, it declined to rule on Debra's vested rights argument. 
Debra's vested rights claim is also raised in this appeal as an "additional issue." 
3 
C. Concise Statement of Facts. 
1. The parties to this action are the parents of Erik B. Peterson, born April 
20, 1984 ("Erik"), who is presently twenty-eight (28) years of age. 
2. Debra was ordered to pay child support to Defendant on behalf of Erik 
pursuant to an order entered on January 9, 1998 by the Third District Court of Canyon County, 
Idaho in this proceeding CV-85-06810-C (the "Child Support Order.") (Affidavit of Stephanie 
West In Support of Motion for Renewed Child Support Judgment dated August 4,2011 (the 
"Affidavit"), ~ 2) 
3. Erik is the "last child for whom support is owed under the judgment" as 
contemplated by §to-l110, Idaho Code, as amended. 
4. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support 
("DHW") purportedly began attempts to enforce the Child Support Order on January 26, 1998. 
Affidavit, ~ 3. 
5. The amount of arrear ages at issue is $7,125.01 as of August 1,2011. 
6. Erik became emancipated l not later than April 20, 2002 when he reached 
the age of 18 years. Accordingly, any amounts of child support alleged owed by Plaintiff accrued 
between January 9, 1998 and April 20, 2002. 
7. The applicable Statute of Limitations in effect prior to the amendments 
IThe triggering event for the end of the statute of limitations on the lien arising from § 1 0-
lItO, Idaho Code, is based upon the child's "emancipation," which could conceivably occur prior 
to the child's 18th birthday. See definition of "emancipation" in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 
(Rev. 1968) For purposes of the pending motion, however, Debra does not contend that Erik was 
emancipated prior to his 18th birthday, which in Idaho marks the end of Plaintiff's support 
obligations. See, for example, Noble v. Fisher, Idaho, 894 P.2d 118, 123 (1995) [citing] Walborn 
v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 499-500, 817 P.2d 160, 165-66 (1991) 
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passed by the 2011 Idaho Legislature disallowed the commencement of"[a]n action or 
proceeding to collect child support arrearages"2 after April 20, 2007, which is five (5) years after 
Erik reached his majority. 
8. The instant Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment dated 
August 4,2011 (the "Motion") was filed on or about August 8, 2011, which is more than four (4) 
years after the expiration of the statute oflimitations in effect on April 20, 2007 and thereafter. 
9. The Motion in pertinent part "is brought pursuant to Idaho Code §10-1111 
as amended and modified by 2011 Idaho Session Laws §§ 104 and 331, which specifically allows 
for the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, Bureau of Child Support to renew any Idaho 
child support judgment currently being enforced by the Department, which otherwise could be 
deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the plain and unambiguous language of §§ I 0-111 0 and 10-1111 (2) as 
amended in 2011, regardless of other possible indicators oflegislative intent, 
precludes the renewal of a child support judgment against Plaintiff-Appellant 
because such judgment had expired subsequent to the expiration of the lien created 
by § 1 0-1110, and could only be renewed so long as the renewal occurred prior to 
the expiration of the lien as the District Court concluded. 
2Section 5-245, Idaho Code. 
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B. Whether Plaintiff-Appellant had a vested right in the statute of limitations defense 
to DHW's actions which cannot, as a matter oflaw, be taken away by subsequent 
legislation. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF §§11-1110 and 11-1111 
COLLECTIVELY EXPRESSES THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT THAT 
ONL Y THOSE ACTIONS FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE LIEN 
CREATED BY §10-1110 ARE SUBJECT TO RENEWAL, AND THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S RELIANCE UPON THAT LANGUAGE TO DISMISS 
THE STATE'S ACTION TO RENEW THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPER 
1. The Controlling Statutory Language is Clear and Unambiguous that No 
Judgment for Child Support Can be Renewed Unless the Motion 
Contemplated by §10-1111 Is Filed Before the Expiration of the Lien 
Created by §lO-llIO, Which Was Not Done in This Case 
Legislative intent in Idaho is determined first from the actual language of the statute in 
question. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the Court to 
forego the application of any rules of statutory construction and enforce the statute according to 
its terms. Indeed, unless the result is "palpablY absurd" this Court must assume that the 
Legislature meant what it said and enforce it as written. Only if the statute is ambiguous, i. e., if 
reasonable minds may differ or be uncertain about its meaning, can the Court engage any rules of 
statutory construction. Plaintiff believes that the applicable statutory language is clear and 
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unambiguous and does not allow the renewal of the judgment against her sought by the DHW. 
Amended Section 10-1111 (2)3 is restated in its entirety as follows, with the provision 
directly relating to this matter emphasized by underlining: 
Unless the judgment has been satisfied, and prior to the expiration of the lien 
created in section 10-1110. Idaho Code, or any renewal thereof, a court that has 
entered a judgment for child support may, upon motion. renew such judgment. 
The renewed judgment may be enforced in the same manner as the original 
judgment, and the lien established thereby shall continue for ten (10) years from 
the date of the renewed judgment. 
"The lien" referred to in § 1 0-1111 is found in the following language from § 1 0-111 04, the 
parts directly relating to this matter again emphasized by underlining 
A transcript or abstract of any judgment or decree of any court of this state ... 
may be recorded with the recorder of any county of this state, who shall 
immediately record and docket the same as by law provided, and from the time of 
such recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes a lien upon all 
real property of the judgment debtor in the county, not exempt from execution, 
owned by him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the expiration 
of the lien; provided that where a transcript or abstract is recorded of any 
judgment or decree of divorce or separate maintenance making provision for 
installment or periodic payment of sums for maintenance of children ... , such 
judgment or decree shall be a lien only in an amount for payments so provided, 
delinquent or not made when due .... A lien arising from the delinguency of a 
payment due under a judgment for support of a child issued by an Idaho court 
continues until five (5) years after the death or emancipation of the last child for 
whom support is owed under the judgment unless the underlying judgment is 
renewed, .... [emphasis added] 
It is the intent of the Legislature that is paramount,s and where the statutory language is 
3 As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
4As amended by the 2011 Legislature. 
5See Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese a/Boise, 123 Idaho 425, 428,849 
P.2d 98, 101 (1993) 
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plain and unambiguous, as Plaintiff asserts this language is, "this Court must give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Rhode, Idaho, 988 P.2d 
685,688 (1999) [citing] State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578,581 (1995). "Unless 
the result is palpably absurd," this Court must assume that the Legislature said what it meant and 
meant what it said. Rhode at 688 [citing] Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 
(1986). If the pertinent statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court is not allowed to 
engage in statutory construction. See Thomas v. Worthington, 132 Idaho 825, 979 P.2d 1183, 
1187 (1999), wherein the Court stated as follows: 
Statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the literal words of the 
statute. [citing] State ex reI. Lisby v. Lisby, 126 Idaho, 776, 779, 890 P.2d 727, 730 
(1995). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. Id. In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, 
the Court may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and 
contemporaneous context at enaction. [citing] Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. 
Ada County, 123 Idaho 410,416,849 P.2d 83,89 (1993). However, if statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the statute without 
engaging in any statutory construction. [citing] State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 404 (1997). 
The statutory language of § 1 0-1111 (2) clearly and plainly states that a judgment for child 
support can only be renewed, if at all, prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110. 
The statutory language of § 1 0-111 0, in turn, clearly and plainly states that the lien it creates is 
valid only for five (5) years after Erik's emancipation, which at the latest was April 20, 2007. 
Therefore, the clear and plain language of these statutes as amended in 2011 allows a renewal of 
the judgment against Plaintiff only if it occurred prior to April 20, 2007 at the latest. 
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Because DHW's Motion was filed more than four (4) after the expiration of the lien, the renewal is 
time-barred and it was reversible error for the Magistrate Judge to rule otherwise.6 
2. Even if the so-called "Retroactivity Provision" of the 2011 amendments is held by 
this Court to be authoritative as argued by DHW, it is not binding on the District 
Court, and even if this Court concludes it was binding, it can be harmonized with 
the other provisions of the amendment without "Palpable Absurdity" and therefore 
does not require a result different from the District Court Order 
The State attempts to make much of the District Court's decision to rely only upon the 
unambiguous language of 10-1110 and 10-1111 as the statement of legislative intent, rather than to 
consider "the language ofthe Senate bill or any other portion of the legislative history." In so 
doing, the first statement it makes on p. 4 of its Opening Briefis that the legislative intent of the 
Retroactivity Provision was "to remedy a situation in which unscrupulous parents were avoiding 
paying their support obligations until such time that the underlying support obligations became 
uncollectable." There is no known support for the statement, and DHW does not mention it again, 
but Debra does not wish to allow the statement to go unchallenged and urges the Court to ignore 
the statement unless DHW can point to some support in the record, presuming this Court fmds the 
issue relevant to begin with. 
6Also pertinent to this issue is the Legislature's 2011 amendment to §5-245, Idaho Code, 
which provides in pertinent part that [a]n action or proceeding to collect child support arrearages, 
arising under an Idaho child support order, can be commenced at any time prior to the expiration 
of the resulting iudgment or any renewal thereof. ... [emphasis added], demonstrating that 
regardless of all other factors, the Legislature recognized that some judgments for arrearages in 
child support payments were unenforceable, regardless of the 2011 amendments. 
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DHW argued below and now argues before this Court that the following language ofIdaho 
Session Laws, 201 I, Chapter 104 (5), pp. 268-269 evidences the Legislature's intent to override 
and ignore the clear and unambiguous statutory language quoted above in an attempt to make all 
judgments subject to renewal, regardless of whether they are barred by the 5-year rule of the lien 
created by § 1 0-1111 and recognized by § 1 0-111 0 or not: 
... this act shall be in full force and effect ... retroactively to July 1, 1995, and 
shall apply to all orders currently being enforced by the ... Department ... such 
that any Idaho judgment for child support that would otherwise have expired since 
July 1, 1995, may be renewed on or before December 30, 2011.7 
Debra believes DHW's position makes no sense, because it requires the conclusion that the 
amendments in § 1 0-111 0 and § 1 0-1111, which carve out exceptions for child support judgments 
already expired, are meaningless. It is clear from the above language that "this act," [whatever that 
act is], "shall apply to all orders currently being enforced [by DHW]." "This act" obviously refers 
to the 2011 amendments discussed above, and included in and integral to those amendments is the 
provision in § 1 0-1111 (2) that forbids the renewal of a judgment for child support unless the order 
renewing the judgment occurs "prior to the expiration of the lien created in section 10-1110. Idaho 
code, or any renewal thereof .... " [§1O-1111(2)] In other words, the retroactive language of the 
amendments makes "the act" applicable to "any" judgment for child support "that would otherwise 
have expired since July 1, 1995" [as long as the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 and applied by § 10-1111 
has not yet expired]. 
Furthermore, Section 5 of the Session Laws states that the amendments are applicable to 
"any" judgment for child support - not "all" judgments for child support. If the Legislature had 
7DHW Reply Briefin Support of Motion for Entry of Renewed Child Support Judgment 
dated February 15,2012, p. 3. 
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intended to make the Amendment applicable to "all" judgments for child support without 
exception, it could easily have so stated, but did not. Reading the provisions of §5-245, §1O-111O, 
§ 10-1111 (2), and Section (5) of the Session Laws together and harmonizing them with each other 
makes it clear that Section 5 makes the Amendments applicable only to Idaho child support 
judgments where the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 is still in effect, and not otherwise. 8 
It is certainly not "palpably absurd" as discussed in the Rhode case above to conclude that 
the 2011 Legislature intended to limit the retroactive application of the Amendment to 
circumstances where the lien created by § 1 0-111 0 and applied by § 1 0-1111 has not yet expired. 
Indeed, part of the Amendment itself in § 10-1111 (2) was to include the "prior to the expiration of 
the lien created in section 10-1110" language. Therefore, at most there is a difference in how 
DHWand Debra interpret the statutory language of the Amendments, and it is important to note 
that mere differing interpretations of the statutory language do not establish ambiguity. See, for 
example, Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board, l32 Idaho 551,976 P.2d 477,483 
(1999). Ambiguity is established, if at all, where "reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain 
as to its meaning." Payette River at 483 [citing] Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, 891 
P.2d 801,801 (Ct.App.l995). The operative statutory language of the Amendments quoted above 
is so clear and unambiguous that reasonable minds cannot differ or be uncertain about its meaning. 
Notwithstanding the clear and unambiguous statements of the Legislature in the 
amendments themselves, DHW points to the case of Jen-Rath Co., Inc. v. KIT Manufacturing 
Co., l37 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 659 (2002) and argues that in that case "the Supreme Court has 
8The statute must be construed as a whole. Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 
111 (1983), appeal after remand, 111 Idaho 897, 728 P.2d 1306 (1986); 
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made it clear that all provisions of enacting session laws are authoritative" (Appellants' Brief at 5). 
DHW extrapolates that conclusion from this Court's statement that "[t]he [Official] Comments [to 
I.C. §28-2-309] are not authoritative, because they were not contained in the session law that 
adopted I.C. §38-2-309" (Appellant's Briefat 5, citing 48 P.3d at 665). Debra disagrees with 
DHW's logical tautology for at least the following reasons: 
First, Debra believes that DHW is confusing "authoritative" with "binding." The former 
means "having or arising from authority," "official," "of acknowledged accuracy or excellence," 
"highly reliable," and/or ''wielding authority.,,9 Noticeably absent from this list is the word 
"binding." As the District Court stated, "because the language of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, there is no ability of this court to look to the language ofthe Senate bill or any other 
portion of the legislative history" [footnote omitted] (District Court Order, p. 5). 
Second,just because this Court in one instance relating to Article 2 of the VCC stated that 
Official Comments were not authoritative because they were not enacted as part of the session 
laws does not automatically mean that the retroactivity provision in this case is authoritative in an 
entirely different context. DHW has presented no authority that VCC Official Comments, which 
appear to follow every VCC section, are so similar to the retroactivity provision that both should 
be similarly construed and given the same weight, and even if D HW' s argument is persuasive on 
that point, it in no way explains why being merely "authoritative" somehow evolves into being 
"binding," as Debra has discussed in the section immediately above. 
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B. NOTWITHSTANDING THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO §§ 5-245, 10-1110 AND 
10-1 Ill, PLAINTIFF HAD A VESTED RIGHT IN THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE EXISTING PRIOR TO THE 2011 AMENDMENTS 
WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION AS 
A MATTER OF LAW 
Debra's vested right to assert the expired statute of limitations as a bar to DHW's 
collection efforts is properly before this Court as an additional issue. The essence of Debra's claim 
is that that the running of the statute of limitations on or before April 20, 2007 created in her the 
vested right to assert the bar as a defense, and that the 2011 Legislature recognized such vested 
right in its statutory scheme. However, even if this Court disagrees that the 2011 Legislature 
intended to recognize her vested rights, Debra asserts that the 2011 Amendments cannot take 
away those rights as a matter of law, as discussed below. 
The theory espoused by DHW is that the Amendments authorize DHW to "renew any 
Idaho child support judgment currently being enforced 10 by the Department, which otherwise could 
be deemed to have expired since July 1, 1995." [DHW Motion, p. 2] Plaintiff does not believe that 
was the intent of the 2011 Legislature. As the discussion in Section A above shows, the clear and 
unambiguous language of the Amendments reflects otherwise. However, in the event the Court 
disagrees with Debra's position, Debra asserts that the applicable statute of limitations barred 
actions both to renew the original judgment and all actions to enforce the same on April 20, 2007 
10There is no known reason, either legal or otherwise, why the "current enforcement" 
language referred to DHW would or should have any effect whatsoever on the issue of 
retroactivity or why such a provision would or should determine whether a statute oflimitation 
expired or not. 
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at the latest, and any attempt by the Legislature to resurrect the judgment must fail as an 
unauthorized extension ofits legislative authority. 
Thus, the issue before this Court is therefore whether a child support order which had 
previously expired pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations in effect at the time of its 
expiration may be resurrected by an amendment, applied after the fact of expiration, purporting to 
extend that statute of limitations retroactively. As is discussed in more detail in the following 
arguments, once a child support order has expired under the then-applicable statute of limitations, 
a vested right to assert the bar of the statute of limitations arises, and any subsequent attempt to 
revive or resurrect it must fail as a matter of law. 
Roark v. Crabtree, Utah, 893 P. 2d 1058 (1995), although not an Idaho case, is a case on 
point and offers a thoughtful discussion of the pertinent issues which Debra hopes this Court will 
find persuasive. Furthermore, the Roark opinion espouses the majority rule,11 which Debra hopes 
this Court will follow. 
In Roark a female plaintiff filed a civil action for damages against a man arising out of 
alleged sexual assaults against her while she was a teenager and under the age of 18. Under Utah 
law, all claims arising from such alleged abuse were tolled until she was 18 years old. Thereafter, 
tort claims for assault and battery had to be brought within one (1) year and claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress within four (4) years, i.e., December 1, 1980, or be time-barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. No lawsuit was filed prior to December 1, 1980. 
Some twelve (12) years later, in 1992, the Utah Legislature passed §78-12-25.l, Utah 
Code, a statute entitled "Civil Actions for Sexual Abuse of a Child" (the "Sexual Abuse 
11 Roark at 1063. 
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Amendment"). Pursuant to the Sexual Abuse Amendment, a person was allowed to file a civil 
action "for intentional or negligent sexual abuse suffered as a child within four years after 
discovery ofthe sexual abuse." [emphasis added] Roark at 1060. Roark in 1993 filed her civil 
action on the basis of the Sexual Abuse Amendment and the allegation that she only recently 
discovered the connection between the sexual abuse suffered as a child and her current (i.e., 1993) 
extreme mental and emotional distress. 
The trial court dismissed Roark's complaint on Crabtree's motion to dismiss on the basis 
that "Roark's claims were time barred under the pre-1992 statutes of limitations and that section 
78-12-25.1 could not be applied retroactively to revive those claims." Roark at 1060. 
Plaintiff recognizes that in the Roark case the Utah Legislature had not opted for 
retroactive application of the Amendment, whereas in the case before this Court DHW has 
asserted that the Idaho legislature has manifested its intent that §§ 11-111 0, 11-1111 and 5-254 be 
applied retroactively. However, as argued in Section A above, that fact is of little, ifany, 
consequence to this case because the retroactivity provision is not binding, and Legislative intent 
was determined from the amendments themselves. The rule of decision in Roark is based entirely 
upon whether the defense of statute of limitations is a vested right and not upon legislative intent. 
Indeed, the only reason legislative intent was even discussed in Roark in the first place was because 
it was raised by Roark as a reason to apply the Sexual Abuse Amendment retroactively, even 
though not mandated by the Utah legislature. 
The Roark Court specifically defined the issue it was deciding as: 
whether the defense of statute oflimitations is a vested right. Phrased differently, 
can a claim which was barred under the then-applicable statute of limitations be 
revived by a subsequent extension of the limitation period?" Roark at 1062. 
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The Roark Court answered the question in the negative, following the majority rule and 
citing a number of authorities therefor: Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Accident Comm 'n, 198 
Cal. 631, 246 P.I046, 1048 (1926); Corbett v. General Eng'g & Mach. Co., 160 Fla. 879, 37 
So.2d 161, 162 (1948); Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 365 Mo. 94, 182 S.W.2d 86, 104 (1944), overruled 
on other grounds, Director of Dept' of Revenue v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent 
Tax Liens, 555 S.W.2d 293,297 (Mo. 1977); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 53 S.E.2d 263, 
265 (1949); Dunham v. Davis, 229 S.C. 29, 91 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1956); and the following 
citation from 51 AmJur .2d limitation of actions §44 (1970): 
"[T]he great preponderance of authority favors the view that one who has become 
released from a demand by the operation of the statute oflimitations is protected 
against its revival by a change in the limitation law." Accordingly, "after a cause of 
action has become barred by the statute of limitations the defendant has a vested 
right to rely on that statute as a defense ... which cannot be taken away by 
legislation ... or by affirmative act. such as lengthening of the limitation period." 
[emphasis by italics maintained in citation; emphasis by underling added] 
Although the undersigned has yet to find an Idaho case directly on point, there are a 
number ofldaho cases which recognize the existence and sacrosanct nature of vested rights and 
strongly suggest the same result as the Roark case cited above. For example, in the case of In the 
matter of Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc. v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 636 P.2d 745 (1981) an 
applicant for a water appropriation permit claimed he was negatively affected by an amendment to 
the Idaho Code while his application was pending. Hidden Springs, pp. 745-746. Although the 
Hidden Springs court ultimately determined that the applicant in that case had no vested right that 
was affected by the subsequent legislation, it is its discussion of vested rights themselves which is 
critical for purposes of this case. First, the Hidden Springs court recognized the importance of 
"vested rights," meaning "already existing rights." Hidden Springs at 746. Secondly, it held at 
16 
747 that because the applicant's right was not such a right, it was "not therefore a right rising to 
any vested level which would preclude application of the amended [statute]." [emphasis by 
underlining added] Needless to say, if the right in question in the Hidden Springs case had been 
vested, the amended statute would not and could not have been applied to negate it. 
In Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 448 P.2d 977 (1969), the Idaho Supreme Court, in 
construing whether a retired policeman's vested pension rights could be negatively affected by an 
act passed by the Legislature after his retirement, observed at 980 that "if respondent [the retired 
policemen] had acquired pension rights under [the statute in place at his retirement], those existing 
rights could not be taken from him by a later act of the legislature." [emphasis by underlining 
added] 
In Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990) the Idaho Supreme 
Court reviewed the trial court's summary decision that Olsen's cause of action was barred by 
Idaho's products liability statute of repose. Olsen at 1287. In concluding that the statute of 
repose was a legitimate exercise of the Legislature's authority, the Olsen Court cited with approval 
the case of Rosenberg v. Town of Bergen, 61 N.J. 190,293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972) for the 
proposition that the Legislature has the power "to abolish rights that have not yet vested," 
[emphasis added] as reflected in the Rosenberg Court's ruling [293 A.2d at 667] that "[t]he 
Legislature is entirely at liberty to create new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right 
is disturbed. Olsen at 1298. [emphasis added]. 
In Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 448 P.2d 209, Idaho, (1986) the Court at 214-
215 recognized that "prevailing zoning ordinances" gave the applicant of a building or use permit a 
vested right at the time offiling for the permit, and the city's belated attempt to change the 
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applicable zoning ordinance was ineffectual. [citing] State ex reI. Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 
Wash.2d 294, 275 P.2d 899 (1954) 
The case of State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 796 P.2d 121 (1990) is likewise instructive. 
Although 0 'Neill is a criminal case, the 0 'Neill Court identified and discussed the existence and 
importance of a vested right in a statute of limitations, which parallels the issue in this case. In so 
doing, the Idaho Supreme Court cited with approval the following pertinent language from 
Washington Supreme Court case State v. Hodgson, 108 Wash.2d 662, 740 P.2d 848 (1967) cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 938, 108 S.Ct. 1117, 99 L.Ed.2d 277 (1988): 
. . . statutes of limitation are matters of legislative grace; they are a surrendering by 
the sovereign of its right to prosecute. Since they are measures of public policy 
only, and subject to the will of the Legislature as such, they may be changed or 
repealed in any case where the right to a dismissal has not been absolutely acquired 
by the completion of the running of the statutory period of limitation. 
This is not to say that a prosecution once barred by the running of the applicable 
statute of limitation can be revived by the Legislature. It cannot be. The classic 
explanation is that of Judge Learned Hand: Certainly it is one thing to revive a 
prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life .... 
Accordingly, "[u]ntil the statute has run it is a mere regulation of the remedy ... 
subject to legislative control. Afterwards it is a defense, not of grace, but of right 
not contingent, but absolute and vested, ... not to be taken away by legislative 
enactment." ... [emphasis by underlining added; quoted material retained] 
The common thread among the cases cited above is the recognition of the existence, 
validity, and importance of vested rights and the fact that once possessed, such rights cannot be 
taken away by subsequent legislation. In this case Plaintiff had the ''vested or already existing 
right" to assert the statute of limitations defense to an action by Defendant to renew the child 
support judgment against her. That right accrued not later than April 20, 2007. At the same 
moment, any right to renew the judgment on the part of Defendant or the State ofIdaho on his 
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bebalt died and. remained dead uatil 2011, wben the State attempted. to renew the judgment, 
a1leginatbat the 2011 Idaho Legislature had decreed that the right of renewal bad been 
resurrected. Plaintift'respcctfWly disagrees and urges tb.e Court to adopt the mliop discussed 
above. 
VL CONCLUSION 
An integral part of the statutory scheme promulgated by the 2011 Idaho leaislature is the 
prov:ision in § 1 0-1111 that in order for the statute to apply retroactively, a juclgmeat must be 
renewed ''prior to the expiration of the lien created ill section 10-1110 .... " In this case, since the 
lien created in § 10-1110 expired, at the latest, on Apri120. 2007, it is now impossible to renew the 
judgment _ of (;OUfSe, impossible to apply the amendments tctroactlvely. 
Regardless of the 2011 ~ it is 1egal1y ilnpossible fot the Legislature to 
retroactively abolish a vested rlgbt. Plaintiff's tight to assert the statute of lJrnitatiODJ defense is 
3UCh a right, and the.fudsment oftbe magistrate court must also fail on that basis alone. 
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